The method of attaining knowledge has been a topic of debate though out philosophy since as far as it has been recorded. A certain perception of this method, which held rule over all others during the medieval era was the proposition of divine illumination. Two philosophers who have dealt with divine illumination are Henry of Ghent in his “Summa of Ordinary Questions” and John Duns Scotus in his “Ordinatio”. While these two men were not the only ones to voice their opinions on the matter, they and their works shall be the focus in the following assessment of the two sides regarding the issue. Henry of Ghent is of the view that divine illumination is necessary for man to truly know anything. John Duns Scotus, who from here on will be referred to as Duns Scotus, holds the opposite view that divine illumination is not the reason for why human have the ability to cognize truth.
Before moving on to the discussion regarding divine illumination and its plausibility or not, it is crucial to define divine illumination itself. Divine illumination essentially states that a special divine assistance is required by humans in ordinary cognition of the truth. This is the simplest outline of divine illumination. From here it is prudent to consider arguments for divine illumination and then consider this arguments against. From there is an assessment of both opinion can be made and a crude conclusion may be form, or at the least that is the hope.
Since we should look at the arguments for why divine illumination is true, we turn to Henry of Ghent and his “Summa of Ordinary Questions”. In the simplest of terms, Henry of Ghent held that it is possible to know whether an object is true. This is agreed upon by most, but Henry goes further to say that any truth at all which is to be cognized requires intervention on God’s part for complete cognition to occur. To explain the first part of the Ghent’s opinion to be able to know what is true of a thing is different than knowing the truth of the same thing. He means that knowing what is true of a thing is to be able to represent the thing as it appears to be; and by knowing the truth of a thing is synonymous of knowing its nature. For Ghent, the first requires nothing to be knowing, but to know the nature of the thing, that is what requires God’s divine hand in human cognition. The key point of debate, as should have been apparent, is regarding this latter part, where divine illumination is necessary to know the nature of a thing. For Ghent and others, like Aristotle, only knowing the nature of a thing counts as having knowledge. Ghent holds that to be able to know anything the essence of the object should be grasped, and for him this cannot be done within the cognitive ability found in man, it requires the illumination of mind only God can provide. The key point of Ghent’s argument is that he says God is an intellect, much like what Aristotle says, he goes on to say that human intellect is from the divine intellect of God, however as human, we are not on the same cognizing ability level of God, this is the reason why we cannot cognize the nature of things without God’s assistance. From here we move on to John Duns Scotus, the opponent to Ghent’s divine illumination argument.
Duns Scotus argues that divine illumination is not necessary, and may in fact not be able to work if everyone was to take Ghent’s reasoning to heart. In his “Ordinatio”, Duns Scotus says that if without divine illumination no certain knowledge is possible, then even with divine illumination no certain knowledge is possible. This is explained as the infallibility attributed to humans in this aspect, is not something which is acute and contained, it would be an infallibility that affected the whole of the human cognition. Therefore, if humans cannot have certain knowledge without divine illumination, they should be able to have knowledge with divine illumination. Scotus, himself, holds the view that the human mind is capable of knowing truth on its own, without divine illumination. He goes on to outline four kinds of cognition in which there would appear to be necessary certainty. The first kind of cognition that is necessarily certain is regarding first principles. He says that the terms of the first principle are so self-evident that it is necessary for all of them to exist together, and when we cognize the terms it is not some great mystery as to what the terms entail, since one always includes the others. He goes onto say about the first kind that sense are not required to be able to compose formally these self-evident principles. With just the intellect alone, it is possible to know the that which is self-evident. The second kind of cognition comes from experience had by the individual. This it, seems, Scotus is trying to say is not as strong as the first kind, but is still necessarily certain. He says that we know, with infallibility, things from experience; and from experience which principles can be derived. He says experience allows us to makes conclusion even without the principle to guide us. This is sort of an inductive kind of cognition which relies of the past endeavors of the human mind to reach certain conclusions. The third kind of cognition is the cognition of self-action, a self awareness. Duns Scotus, likens the certainty of this kind of cognition to the first, self-evident kind of cognition. He says that even without the sense the intellect is aware of itself and the action it takes up. The last kind of cognition is the sensory kind. This is simple for Scotus to explain, but it also has the potential to be the most problematic. We are, for the most part, certain of what our sense tell us. Humans live through their sense, and consider anyone that is deprived of a sense to be disabled. This is the end of Scotus’ view on how divine illumination is not necessary for humans to be able to cognize the truth of things.
It is important to take both these views into account, especially Scotus’ since it is said that he was the one who officially closed the philosophical debate on divine illumination. Ghent’s view is derived from Aristotle and Augustine. Aristotelean philosophy was greatly important during the Medieval times, so it is easy to see the influence he would have had on the topic. Augustine was credited to be the first medieval philosopher to bring divine illumination back to the surface of debate. The idea that Ghent proposes that God is the perfect intellectual agent comes from Aristotle. Aristotle says that the Divine being is the first principle of all. Everything is is causally rooted in God. Ghent then goes onto say that humans cannot fully know the truth of a thing without God’s guidance. This follows from the claim that God is the first principle of all and therefore all truths can be known by him and through him. While to the theistic philosopher this is very appealing, the rest of philosophy, may find Scotus’ view on divine illumination much acceptable. Scotus says that humans have the ability to know truths, especially truth that are necessarily certain, such as first principles and self-awareness. This appeals to the nature of the human being which wants to know. The curiosity of man, as it were.
Between the two views of divine illumination, the latter, as presented by Scotus against divine illumination, seems to hold a larger place in the realm of discussion so far. At the time, Scotus seemed to shut the door on any further debate. While Henry of Ghent’s view may not be all that popular there is something to it, the fusion of Aristotelean and Augustinian doctrine, that appeals to the religious philosopher.
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